The first quantitative mention Lexmark ever offered on its MPS business came in its first-quarter 2011 financial report, when the firm declared that its MPS growth had been in the “strong double digits.” In subsequent quarters, Lexmark continued to offer tantalizing but vague descriptions of its MPS growth rate: “double digit” (but not “strong” double digit) in the second quarter of 2011, “greater than 25 percent” in the third quarter, then merely “strong” in the fourth quarter, then back to “double-digit” in the first quarter of 2012.

In the second quarter of 2012, Lexmark’s MPS reporting shifted gears, and the firm released a real number, not just vague adjectives: its MPS business grew at 8 percent year-on-year, the firm reported. There were two surprises in this figure: that Lexmark released it at all, and that its MPS growth rate had drastically decelerated from the “double digit,” “strong double-digit,” and “greater than 25 percent” rates reported only a few quarters before. Both trends continued in the third quarter: Lexmark again released a real MPS growth rate number—2 percent year-on-year—and the number confirmed the continued deceleration of the firm’s MPS growth rate.

In the fourth quarter of 2012, Lexmark’s MPS reporting shifted gears again. As it had in the previous two quarters, the firm disclosed its MPS growth rate, which was up slightly from the previous quarter, to 3 percent year-on-year. However, for the first time, Lexmark also revealed the actual size (in revenue) of its MPS business in the fourth quarter: $170 million, or 18 percent of its total revenue of $967 million.

The disclosure of the size of Lexmark’s MPS business offers many angles for analysis, but we’ll focus on one: why exactly did Lexmark choose to release its MPS revenue now and, more broadly, why have the firm’s MPS disclosures gotten increasingly specific, even though these numbers have delivered the news that the firm’s MPS business is growing ever more slowly?

Legally, companies have considerable flexibility in what they must report to their investors. Once they have disclosed the required basics—a balance sheet, an income statement, “material events,” and so on—everything else is up to them. Lexmark, obviously, didn’t have to disclose its MPS revenue and revenue growth rate; the firm chose to.

Over and above fulfilling legal reporting responsibilities, the financial reports of public companies serve a second vital function, to boost the company in the eyes of investors and financial analysts. Lexmark has been boasting about the growth of its MPS business and it is one of the few businesses the company has that has been growing in recent years. However, the downside about revealing details about a key business is that, of course, competitors find out and exploit that information.

So, how can the pattern of Lexmark’s MPS disclosures be explained? Clearly, the vague but upbeat initial disclosures (“strong double-digit” and so on) reflected the firm’s desire to brag without giving away the entire store to the competition. But what explains why Lexmark started to disclose real MPS growth numbers in the second quarter of 2012?

A close look at just how Lexmark’s 8 percent MPS growth rate was revealed is telling. The company did not put the disappointing number in its quarterly press release or in the presentation given to analysts. Nor was it mentioned by the firm’s executives in their quarterly call. Rather, the MPS growth rate was buried on page 38 of Lexmark’s second-quarter 10-Q report, which was released several weeks after the rest of the information on the quarter’s results. This suggests that Lexmark did not want to call attention to the figure; otherwise the firm would have put it in the presentation or press release. Indeed, while Lexmark did discuss its MPS business in its quarterly presentation, it said only that it had experienced “growth” (no qualifying adjectives).

Why did Lexmark disclose the 8 percent MPS growth figure at all if it didn’t want it to be noticed? Our best guess is that the firm felt that its MPS growth rate had become “material” and therefore could not be omitted without some legal risk. Why had the MPS growth rate become material? Perhaps only because Lexmark had boasted about it for the five previous quarters. To suddenly omit the figure because it had declined would smack of deception.

We recall a similar situation years before at HP. For years, the company included a growth rate figure for its color LaserJet unit sales in its quarterly presentation. Suddenly one quarter, the number disappeared. An industry analyst asked the head of HP’s printer division why the figure had vanished. The executive waffled evasively without offering a real answer. Amazingly, a revised version of the presentation that included the number—which as it happens had fallen dramatically that very quarter—appeared on HP’s investor-relations Web page a few days later.

The final mystery in Lexmark’s MPS reporting is why the firm chose to disclose its actual MPS revenue last quarter. Again, it is important to note how Lexmark revealed the figure. In this case, it was not hidden deep in a lengthy 10-Q filing, it was right on the second page of the press release announcing the firm’s fourth-quarter results.

Our guess is that Lexmark is building a case that its two growing businesses—MPS and Perceptive Software—are significant enough to offset (partially now, maybe entirely) later its soon-to-evaporate ink jet business and its struggling laser business. Even though Lexmark’s MPS business is not growing strongly any more, at least it is growing, and the fact that it is sizable (as noted earlier, 18 percent of total revenue) enhances the credibility of the case Lexmark is trying to build.